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Abstract
For the past thirty years Europe faces tumultuous counter action that appears to threaten the 
normative ideal of European institution. Driven by the call of recognition and acknowledgement, 
post-colonial migrants have posed a question on the basic presumption that bound European societies 
for long. Approach to assimilation, integration and multicultural society, appears to be inadequate 
to appeal migrants submit in the mainstream value. Demographically, ideologically and mythically 
threatening, Muslims are at the most part stand affront the greater challenge for European culture. 
The paper tries to bring to light the discourse that set this threat appearance come into being in 
European public sphere. Taking post-colonial on loan of description, the paper claim to overview the 
need to re-course the relations between Muslims and Europe, and the way discourse on Islam can be 
practiced in between.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern European institutions, seen in 
the formation of the nation states—organics in 
political, economic, and social organization—is 
highly acclaimed as the foundation of authority, 
which mark the establishment of current 
international relations. This long standing 
tradition has been becoming the exemplar of 
many states around the world to take on board. 
The nationalism movement, partly the brainchild 
of European Enlightenment, has given impetus to 
the colonized people aspiring for their national 
self-determination and self-government. Despite 
the bitter experiences of having been colonized, 
most of the post-independent states tried to 
emulate the archetype modernity of European 
institution. This demonstrates the historical 
trajectory of, and the continual relations between, 
Europe and the colonized subjects. 
The historical trajectory and the unbroken 
relations between Europe and the colonized 
subjects, however, can hardly be seen in a linear 
and a single attitude, given that history assigns lot 
modalities of participatory. Once being burden in 
the exterior homeland of Europe, the colonized 
subject has now been occupying the interior 
home of Europe through migration process. 
This defying route poses a griming challenge of 
Europe to preserve their venerable institution in 
the presence of Other. Stained by issues of ethno-
racial outsider, Muslims migrants apply for 
Europe’s special heed in anticipating the issue of 
the constitutive Other. This paper aims to mark out 
the focus of discussion on the boisterous relations 
between Europe and their Muslims migrants, in 
loan from the post-colonial perspective.
This paper breaks away from the 
colonialist held position over Muslims, that 
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keenly present their arguments by emphasizing 
the peril Muslim (instead of Muslims) character. 
Despite its narrowness, this predisposition has 
found its way through extremist exhibitions in 
the public arena which is, not only threatening, 
but also sacrificing the life of civilians. This paper 
also flees from the anti-colonialist standpoint, 
which tries to assail the Europe for the problem 
inherited by colonization. Taking an alternative, 
this paper wants to run ahead of the two poles 
of extreme. Post-colonial perspective will be on 
loan to help reading and expounding the problem 
in the relationship between Muslims migrants in 
Europe. 
The reading is to be based on the 
outsiders’ viewpoint of Europe and of the relation 
between Muslims and Europe. Lack of empirical 
observation, this study plainly refers to Muslims 
and Europe in a broad sense of understanding, 
without any particular suggestion. Deficient of 
experiential investigation, this study is aimed 
at understanding the contemporary Muslims-
Europe relation, which is conducted through a 
reading on the discourse of their past and present 
connection. The discussion of the paper will be 
divided into three parts. The first part discuss over 
the historical antecedent of Muslims encounter 
with Europe. The second part discuss about the 
trend of bulking Muslims migration in Europe 
and the discourses around Muslims presence in 
European public sphere. Yearning for the main 
discussion, the last part corroborate the previous 
two discussions into a post-colonial reading of 
the present situation faced by Muslims migrants 
in Europe and the translation of the legacy of 
their association. 
DISCUSSION
Muslims and Europe: First Encounter
Muslim world and Europe has a long 
tradition to share between their kingdoms. 
Muslim world was founded on the caliphates rule, 
derived from the revelation of Islamic teaching, 
while Europe was founded on the Christendom 
reign, derived from the revelation of Christianity, 
secondary to Judaist tradition; both ensuing from 
the genesis of Abraham. While they are sharing 
historical lineage of canonical birth, their earthly 
formation were built on vilification of each other. 
Fail to remember the other-half naration; the 
overwhelming narrative is the contour which 
outlines the memories on how relations arise 
between them. Out of this narrative, Muslims 
and Europe are bounded in a relation, based upon 
the foundation of conflict and distrust (Wharton, 
2008). 
The modern European society was 
demarcated by the historical evolution of 
Europe’s border to resist Muslims’ unfriendliness. 
European civilization, composed of myriad bases 
of European identities, is also differentiated by its 
geographical and cultural exclusion of the Islamic 
Other. The marriage of myth and historical 
experience, which underpins the establishment 
of modern Europe was based on the struggle 
against Islamic threat and Muslims enmity. The 
1453 Ottoman siege of Vienna and the Spanish 
Reconquista have been playing a profound pattern 
of Europe’s and Muslims’ psyche and perception 
of identity, in reprisal (Wharton, 2008).   
Despite the projection of their cyclical 
rise and downfall turn, it is Europe who is now 
recognized as the heir of the modern world, while 
the Muslim world is lightyears behind. European 
success to flee from the Medieval Age started the 
downturn episode of European civilization, while 
leaving Muslim world into its decadence. In early 
19th century, the Napoleon exposition to Egypt 
was a sign of the decay of the Muslims world. 
Gallantry on one side, systematic colonization 
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was started to instill on the other side and 
began the elongated epoch of colonialism. The 
subjugation of Muslim world in face of Europe 
is epitomized in the narrative of Orientalism, a 
plague that most Muslims assume with angst.
Even after the establishment and growth 
of the nation-state and the supranational body 
which necessitates the basic requirement of 
sovereignty and international cooperation, there 
is constant raw memories and rage aversion 
between Muslims and Europe. While one sees 
the Other as a White men’s burden, another 
sees the Center as parasitic. There is not enough 
breathing space in all the more situation of 
fortifying current politic and economy. Bent by 
their colonial inheritance, it leaves the world in a 
predetermined mode of the West and the Rest, the 
First World and the Third World, the Developed 
countries and the Least Developed countries, the 
active Self and the carbon copy of the passive 
Other. Myth of one’s superiority is a dilute idea 
of one’s inferior, where in between stretch out the 
symbolical stamp of Islam from which it exhibits 
the curtailed dialectical mode of reference: 
primitive, passé, and defunct vs. aloof, swollen, 
and conspicuous. 
Muslims Migrants and Muslim Representation 
in European Public Sphere: Second Encounter
The flow of Muslims migration in Europe 
has actually begun at the end of the Second 
World War. Around this period was the initial 
era of decolonization, when influx of migrants 
came from former colonized countries to former 
colonizing countries. Important to mention here 
were migrants from Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia who came to France; migrants from 
Pakistan to Great Britain; and migrants from 
Indonesia to Netherlands. 
Another influx of Muslims migrations 
took place during the 1960s and the 1970s, 
which was facilitated by bilateral agreements 
between Western European countries, such 
as Germany and France, and Mediterranean 
countries. Along this trajectory, the continuing 
arrival of refugees, political exiles, and asylum 
seekers from predominantly Muslims countries 
had served to increase the Muslims population 
in Europe. Civil war or political conflicts in 
former colonized countries out of the nation-
building experimentations over the contention of 
democratic/authoritarian and secular/divine rule 
have added the necessities of European world as 
a space of haven for political émigré. Nowadays, 
various types of Muslims migrants come to 
Europe, including students, businesspeople, and 
highly skilled workers (Anspaha, 2008).
Set their foot for long in Europe, Muslims 
has created a route for their cultural identity in 
the adopting European countries. The identity 
of Muslim(s) was merely perceived as cultural 
characteristics during the 1960s, the 1970s, and 
even the 1980s. In this sense, Islam was regarded 
as “a set of religious practices and beliefs that 
were often viewed, either implicitly or explicitly, 
as inhibiting the integration of immigrants into 
Western European societies” (Adamson, 2006). 
Omitting religion, nationalities drew their marker 
of difference as foreigners, immigrants, or 
guestworkers, in European societies. It was only 
after the 1990s, the emblem of Islam acquired 
high level of resonance in European countries.
There were many discussions on the 
issue of why Islam had gained more significance 
after the 1990s. Most of the discussion draws 
their explanation by linking this idea with the 
transformation of geopolitical developments, 
which in actual fact has happened since late in 
1970s. Although the trend did not seem to trail into 
particular route, but there was a nuance of political 
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Islam (sic), which was drifted between feats on 
state governance and economic development, at 
the one hand, with the impression on Muslim’s 
political belligerencies and cultural hostilities, 
at the other hand. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, 
the emergence of oil exporting Muslim countries, 
the Palestinian Intifada, and, later, the Chechnya 
Revolution demonstrates the emblematic power 
of Islamist (sic) ideology in concrete political and 
economic spheres. The kidnapping and killing 
of Israelis at the Munich Olympics, the 1979 
Iranian hostage taking, the 1981 assassination of 
Egyptian Prime Minister Anwar Sadat by Muslim 
fundamentalist, the 1980s hostage takings and 
executions of Westerners in Beirut, and the 
Gulf War, all contributed to the reawakening 
of a historical pattern on Muslim antagonism 
(Anspaha, 2008; Gallick, 2005; Wharton, 2008). 
While Muslims outside Europe seemed to 
be increasingly fundamentalist and violent, 
Muslims migrants inside Europe appeared 
to be making more demands on the basis of 
their Muslims identities (Bleich, 2006). This 
is especially strident among second and third 
generation Muslims in Europe. They purported 
Islam as cultural identity that structures their 
religious beliefs and practices, from which 
political mobilization squirted. Muslims assert 
their collective, cultural, subsistence through the 
discourse practice that increasingly structuring 
debates surrounding immigrant incorporation 
within the larger European societies (Maxwell, 
2006). The thing is, Islam has no root in the 
structure of cosmopolitan Europe, which derived 
from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Islam was 
once excavated from Europe through the re-
settlement of the Church power and, henceforth, 
Islam did not have any place in modern European 
history (McCrea, 2007). 
A.Muslims in United Kingdom
United Kingdom (UK) is long rejoiced for 
it successfulness in developing ‘laissez-faire’ 
multiculturalism toward migrants at home, but 
the violent exhibition by Muslims migrants 
fanatics during the 2005 and 2006 has created a 
debate whether there has been a gulf of problems 
that fails to address. The growing disparities 
between Muslims migrants soars the lack of 
confidence among Muslims subgroups to blend 
in the British society and entrap them to deviant 
activities against the majorities (Anspaha, 2008; 
Gallis, 2005).
Muslims in the UK had three times the 
unemployment rate, the lowest economic activity 
rate, a higher proportion of unqualified working 
age individuals, and a higher concentration in 
deprived residential areas. Feeling of social 
alienation, cultural disenfranchisement, and 
political discrimination in a society that does not 
fully accept them, provides a hotbed for breeding 
the ground of radical thought among young 
Muslims in UK. Supplemented by sympathy 
to the suffering experiences of Muslims abroad 
and Western countries’ self-seeking interests of 
unjust foreign policies, these native born Muslims 
migrants help galvanizing insularity overt to the 
extreme activities. The 2005 London attacker 
were born in Britain and all of the 25 suspects 
in the 2006 airline bombing plot were also home 
grown extremists (Anspaha, 2008; Gallis, 2005; 
Wharton, 2008). 
Many Muslims shares the view that the war 
on terror as a war on Islam, even those living 
within the Muslim countries themselves. Blair 
government has been accused of making a wrong 
decision on going to war with the United States. 
The falsehood that lay ground for the war cause 
and the loss created by the war to the elimination 
of Islamic heritage conservation, as in the case 
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of Baghdad museum, has profoundly inflicted an 
interior conflict with Muslims in UK.
A March 2004 opinion poll, composed of 500 
British Muslims respondents, found that more 
than two-thirds believed that British anti-terrorist 
laws were being used unfairly against Muslims 
communities. Although UK officials insisted 
that police authorities would not employ a racial 
profiling and that the stop-and-search policy 
was strictly intelligence-led, but people of color 
were widely exposed as target. The shoot-to-
kill guidelines, initially issued to police in 2002, 
came to be a furor after a London police killed 
a 27-year old Brazilian whom they mistakenly 
believed as a suicide bomber (Anspaha, 2008; 
Gallis, 2005; Wharton, 2008).
B.Muslims in Netherlands
In Netherlands, the posting of a 15-minute film 
called ‘Fitna’ by a right-wing Dutch legislator, 
Geert Wilders, on the maverick video-sharing 
website liveleak.com on March 27 2004, sparked 
another storm, dispersed from the national, the 
continental, and to the most Muslims terrains. 
The film, begins and ends with one of the 
twelve controversial Danish cartoons, links the 
cut verses of the Koran with images and audio 
of recent attacks by Muslim fundamentalists, 
pictures of September 11 attack’s victims, the 
beheading of a man by masked gunmen, the shot 
of a Muslim women draped in burqa, and the 
video of a call for ‘jihad’ from Muslim clerics. 
Wilder himself confessed that the film lucidly 
explain the facist nature of the Koran since it 
incites people to commit violence. He alleged 
that muslim threaten the survival of European 
population and democratic institution. Wilder 
himself is known for his political stance against 
migration and naturalization law of Muslims in 
Europe (Gallis, 2005; Saidazimova, 2008).
Besides Wilder, the voice of anti-integration 
with Muslims migrants may also be seen through 
right-wing groups. In street level alone, there is 
a steeping decline in the acceptance of cultural 
diversity among the population. The regular 
surveys held by the Social and Cultural Planning 
Office, for instance, shown the severe climate of 
opinion regarding migration’s assimilation, and 
the increasing pattern violence among migrants 
and non-migrant populace. The killing of film 
maker Theo van Gogh on November 2 2004 in 
Amsterdam led to a public outcry, which embarked 
a countrywide series of assaults against mosques 
and Muslim schools. This social unrest shows 
“the pre-existing social and political instability in 
a society apparently in search of a new identity” 
(Entzinger, 2006).
In Netherlands, integration is defined in terms 
of migrants’ loyalty to and identification with 
Dutch values and norms, instead of migrants’ 
social and institutional participation. This is partly 
a result of the changing strategy in Netherlands’ 
integration, which was formerly based on the 
conception of “living apart together” through 
the preservation of communities cultural identity 
while, in respect of sovereignty, maintaining 
amities amid the populace into the imposition 
of national historical and cultural digestion over 
migrants. This imposition exhibits in a number of 
ways, such as the mandatory integration courses, 
which is at cost. In earlier times, this course was 
offered free of charge by the local government 
(Entzinger, 2006; Gallick, 2005). 
Currently, in line with the free market 
ideologies, it is migrant’s own responsibility to 
find a course, to register and to pay for it, and, 
eventually, to qualify for a mandatory language-
and-culture test that has to be taken within 
five years after the initial settlement in the 
Netherlands. Those who fail to pass the test will 
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be fined and will be disqualified from permanent 
settlement. Departing from its deliberate manner, 
naturalization becomes a sentence, summarized 
by fine and sanction. Although the ruling is laid on 
economic basis, that is to promote migrants that 
able to correspond with labor market condition, it 
is also a reflection of a systematic mechanism to 
curb the flow of migrants coming to Netherlands, 
let alone acquiring Dutch nationality. The result 
shows, as easily predicted, the plunge of the 
number of migrants naturalized (Entzinger, 2006; 
Van Oers, 2008).  
Bold steps taken by the government has 
inflicted confrontation among migrants for 
having put under pressures. Along with the 
implementation of Dutchness test for immigrants, 
the banning of the burqa in public spaces, the 
reduction of visas approved for imported brides 
of arranged marriages, have rather than curb 
ethnic tensions, earned volatile exposure of more 
violence (Entzinger, 2006).
C.Muslims in French
The separation of church and the state is what 
has instituted the modernization in French since 
the 19th century in which religion is domesticated 
in order to establish a Republican ideal. French 
embrace “laïcité” as the principle of French 
life. “Laïcité” is not simply secularism, but the 
balancing of religious freedom and public order. 
The government protects freedom of religious 
and, at the same time, ensures that religious groups 
do not engage in political activism disruptive of 
public life (Gallick, 2005). 
In place of the ancient regime of religion, 
French modernization rests on human capacities 
in reason, scientific activities, and technological 
invention for the advancement of human life. 
Based on the pet project of French Enlightenment, 
modern French society is built in opposition 
to whatever seen as backward or pre modern 
institution, like feudalism and religion. Through 
a historical series of corruptive dominance under 
the feudal lords, French regards Noble institution 
as primeval bases for an old regime that need to 
be stored in the past. They substitute the role of 
religion as the bases of social norms in forms of 
new religion of humanity, which finds the new 
authority in science in order to emancipate men 
from reason-shackling superstitions. The sacred 
appellation of liberty, equality, and fraternity are 
French modernist catapult deem to be applied 
suitably to everyone (Gouldner, 1975). 
The universalistic tag of liberty, equality, and 
fraternity, has been built on the monocultural 
basis of French experience, and is canonically 
employed in the new generated amalgamating 
society. The disparities grew wider between 
societies in view of late capitalistic life, fused 
with globalization, has cast doubt on the 
relevance of the French’s liberty, equality, and 
fraternity. The liberty is no longer sound in face 
of the rights to express individual uniqueness and 
distinctiveness. There cannot be liberty when 
dictation is put into operation to control how 
people articulate their beingness through cultural 
emblems. 
The equality is invalid before the segregation 
that transpires through the housing seclusion 
and the non-representation of Muslims’ personal 
in French public authorities. The 2005 riots in 
Paris’ suburbs, Lyons, Tolouse, Lille and other 
cities, inhabited by North Africans’, where 
unemployment are high and educational levels 
are low. According to 2005 CRS Report, these 
suburbs are a society apart, their inhabitants 
cut off from most of the opportunities afforded 
French youths who are not Muslim. The rioting 
has largely taken the form of violence against 
poverty. The sense of powerlessness due to 
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economic source and access of limitation, create 
a state of anguish and alienation among French-
born children of immigrants, from which large of 
the percentage are Muslims (Gallis, 2005). 
Henceforth, the fraternity is null before the 
actual presence of opportunities for personal 
welfare and, equally, community’s cultural 
subsistence. French irrecognition of religion to 
equip human with growth and development is 
in contrast to the traditional belief of Muslims 
that sees religion as organically embedded in all 
aspects of human life. Henceforth, when dealing 
with Muslims migrants, French modernistic 
venture proves insufficient, for each taking the 
other as offensive to the survival of their credence. 
French has long rests on the three mainstream 
institutions of public education, military services, 
and employment to assimilate migrants and 
to management of religious practices. Being a 
majority of migrants group in its master colony, 
Muslims fail in integrating themselves through 
these viable instruments. The percentage of 
Muslims who fail to finish secondary school is 
considerably higher than that of non-Muslim. By 
one estimate, 30% or young Algerian and 28% 
Moroccans are unemployed (Gallis, 2008).
While education levels are lowest among 
Muslims migrants, some minority Muslims groups 
has demanded public school to allow Muslim 
girls wearing a headscarf to class, certainly 
viewed in ridicule by the French government. 
Less mockery than this is the insistence of having 
female doctors to treat Muslim female patients 
in public hospitals. Logically these demands are 
judged to be illogical for the government to mend 
for, despite its cracked relations with migrants 
who had been convincingly unable to adjust 
themselves in the expected norms of French 
society (Gallis, 2008).
Yet, it is important to notice that even when 
Muslims accept the republican ideal, this will 
not necessarily lead to their assimilation into 
French society. Citing Gallis in his 2005 CRS 
report to the Congress, studies find widespread 
discrimination against North Africans and other 
Muslims who seek employment in France. Few 
Muslims are visible in the top levels of French 
policies, media, the judiciary, business, and the 
civil services. Moreover, racist violence has been 
rising in France. In 2003 there were 232 recorded 
acts of violence against Muslims, and the number 
exceeded in the following year into 595 cases, 
for which the extreme right-wing groups, like 
National Front Party, are culpable (Gallis, 2008).
Muslims and Europe’s Incessant Relations
As a category, Muslims in Europe can be 
seen as minority group as well as non-minority. 
To be seen as minority, explanation given 
above describes some of the many problems 
faced by Muslims migrants in Europe. Most of 
the research connotes the identity of Muslims 
became the stark identity of difference among 
the large majorities of Europeans. Nonetheless, 
this marking identity of religion is recognized as 
not a sole determining factor that gives cue to the 
estrangement of Muslims in Europe. Economic 
despondency coped by some Muslims migrant 
groups that came to some of European countries, 
such as Germany or France, as non-skilled labor, 
also create reasonable hit for disenfranchisement. 
There is no exact number of Muslims 
population in European countries. According 
to the International Religious Freedom Report 
2004, issued by United States’ Department of 
States, Muslims only make up a small segment 
of European population, no more than 5 percent 
out of more than 425 the whole populace. The 
report shows in detail that, within the EU, France 
has the largest Muslim population – as many 
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as 5 million people, most from North Africa, 
comprising about 8 percent of the country’s total 
population. Germany, with up to 3.5 million, is 
come to the second largest group of Muslims, 
followed by England with 1.6 million and Spain 
and Italy with roughly 1 million each (the PEW, 
2005). Meanwhile the 2005 CSR Report for the 
Congress cites the current Muslims population 
have reached approximately 20-25 million in 
European countries. They are composed of 
a number of European converts to Islam and 
indigenous Muslims population in European 
Union member countries, such as Turkey (Gallis, 
2008). There is a probability of increase in this 
number, given that the fertility and birth rate 
among muslims women are three times higher 
than those of European women, which means 
that there is the a high probability that one day 
muslims population will outnumber the European 
population themselves (the PEW, 2005).
To be seen as minorities, therefore, is 
not necessarily accurate. Some minor findings 
describe the success story of Muslims personalities 
and/or families in Europe. Substantial Muslims 
population live in Germany, UK, France, 
Netherlands, Spain,  Italy, and Belgium; while 
most Nordic and Central European countries 
have smaller Muslims population (Adamson, 
2006; Anspaha, 2008; Wharton, 2008). 
Muslims are the largest minorities in 
Europe and Islam is the fastest growing religion 
developed in Europe. This is fertile ground for 
minority-related issues, as seen by most Muslims 
defender, and majority-related concerns, as 
perceived by most European warden, become 
the hotbed of brazen agonies between the two 
poles and, ironically, find its course in finite 
point of political Islam. The term political Islam 
refers to a politication of Islam, based on the 
deceitful fuse of religious expressions—which is 
culturally bounded and historically draped with 
that of Islamic teaching—addressed in converse 
to serve a blasphemy at the cost of Islam as 
a tenet and Muslims as a collectivity or umma 
(Salvatore, 2007). Labeling political Islam to 
propose virulent actions, or Islamist to bring up 
actors loathe hostilities, by relating Islam as a 
tenet and a modality of subjectivities is, thus, a 
self-denying category (Halavi, 2008).
Put the issue of Islamic veil that sparked 
the debate, not only in France, but also in cities of 
Germany, UK, and Netherlands. The veil connotes 
the denial of public transparency, rather than a 
protective ‘cover’ or ‘screen’, which is closer 
to the meaning of hijab. Lack of historical and 
cultural detail, most Westerners, human rightists 
and feminists seen the practice as denigration, 
illicit, and—therefore—pinpoint the way Islam is 
perceived as a patriarchic in nature. On the other 
hand, the patriarch of Islam themselves oblige 
the use of hijab as a compulsory on grounds of 
sanctity, disregarding the coherent conscientious 
preference from the muslims women themselves 
(Salvatore, 2007).  
The politication of Islamic kept its pace 
since colonial era, through methods of ongoing 
rivalry and competition. Attempt to deliver a 
typology of political Islam, which is basically 
rest on contingent interests, viewpoints, and 
emotions, is parasitic for the least balanced 
and most essentialized view of the relations 
between obsolete Islam and modern Europe. 
The politication of Islam is responded in a rather 
reactionary based, devoid of any mutual stand 
between the need to self-criticize and the need to 
Self-preserve the inner value of Islam as a tenet 
into Islam as a diehard ideology for most of Islamic 
defender. Reading in between, the politication of 
Islam “depends not only on what Muslims do or do 
not do in their various form of collective action or 
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inaction, but also on the simultaneous and mutual 
construction of the imagined realities” between 
the Europe and the muslims (Salvatore, 2007). 
This is what particularly evident in the adjacent 
relations of European homeland nowadays. 
Demographic explosion, the fear of cultural 
backlash, and the prophecy of Islamic world to 
outwin the curvature historical trajectories of 
human life, have all tossed the panic that stepped 
into European public sphere. 
Muslims migrants in Europe are naturally 
diverse in nationality, ethnic, language, and credo 
backgrounds. In Germany, Muslims from Turkey 
nationalities outnumber the others; in France, 
Muslims from Maghreb region in North Africa 
become the significant components of all Muslim 
population; and in Britain, the Muslims migrants 
are drafted from South Asia. It is noteworthy to 
keep in mind, however, that there will never be 
single, solid, and definite Muslim identities in 
each of European countries. While it is generic 
to see the disagreements among Muslims and 
European allies, it is common as well to accept 
that there might also be variance within Muslims 
themselves due to these cultural, religious tenet, 
and ethnical arrays.     
The historical trajectories of Western 
European states have left institutional legacies, 
highly influenced by the church. Although 
secularism was put forward as the ideal 
institutional arrangement for European society, 
Europe cannot escape from its historical ties 
by which state and church inseparable. There 
is no need to argue that European tradition is 
established on the heritage of Judeo-Christian 
tradition. Even after the separation of church 
from the modern state system, adhere to the 
notion of secularism, religion was never put into 
the flipside of the structure (McCrea, 2007). 
Adamson (2006) mentions, for 
example, how religious education was given in 
public schools in Germany, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands; the edifice of national churches 
within the structure of England and Scotland; 
and the long-established attachment of Catholic 
Church with Italy and Spain. The Islam affair 
in Europe edifice splits a variance within this 
uniformity. This split was revealed once the rift 
broke into the surface, following the media event 
of Satanic Verses in Britain and le foulard in France 
during the 1980s (Salvatore, 2007). The event 
has raising debates among politicians and within 
the mass media in Britain and in France. There 
was a premise that Muslims may have different 
values from Europeans, which is incompatible 
to live by. It is precisely the perceived cultural 
incompatibility that has always become the 
building block for the construction of Muslims 
as “ethno-racial outsider” (Bleich, 2006) and the 
politication of Islam (Halavi, 2006). The frantic 
Britain Muslim’s reaction during the Satanic 
Verses in Britain, for example, was also the 
uptight France government response in dealing 
with the issues of hijab. 
While there seemed to be no room left 
for either of the parties to voice and express 
their stance leniently, discourse always offers its 
way out. Either the media has actually dealt with 
similar situation in such a scandalous or courteous 
manner, particular consideration on the role of 
the media in spiraling the information surely 
need to be questioned. While media become the 
machinery of cultural production for maintaining 
power, it is the discourse that had brought about 
cognizant and deliberate manner of postcolonial 
Others to unfetter themselves from the historical 
predicament. Take your pill: Discourse always 
finds its way home. The core problem of Muslims 
and European relations lays not only in the policy 
of positive discrimination as one might suggest, 
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but in a broad sphere of political, cultural, and 
socio-economic bonds, which is fixed in either 
the epistemic distortion, an ethno-centricism, a 
will to dominating, or all of these whims at once. 
CONCLUSION
Muslims migrants become an issue in 
Europe only after there was wide violent actions 
taken against the political order and the social 
code underpinning the European institution. 
Muslims migrants have never been an issue prior 
to this manifested assault. Political Islam coined 
the term used by both sides who take differing 
combat positions.  
Although investment has been made by 
European governments to provide mainstream 
agencies of cultural transmission, like education, 
economic employment, public services, and 
bridging social networks in the communities; 
but advocate to the affinity was narrowly taken. 
Adjacent to the many explanations proposed by 
the study on the Muslims migrants failure to 
integrate with the mainstream values, the parting 
compartment and moderation sanctioned by the 
mainstream institution has generated insolvency 
and destitution, and inflamed revolting passion. 
Historical trail guides the way the relations 
have been, and are continually, maintained by 
presumption and flawed deductions. While it is 
important to put right the issue of opportunity, 
mobilization, participation, and cohabitation; it is 
also worth to strive a tête-à-tête communication, 
exclusive of banishment and extermination.
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